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Abstract— Electrocardiogram (ECG) is the most widely used 
diagnostic tool to monitor the condition of the cardiovascular 
system. Deep neural networks (DNNs), have been developed in 
many research labs for automatic interpretation of ECG signals to 
identify potential abnormalities in patient hearts. Studies have 
shown that given a sufficiently large amount of data, the 
classification accuracy of DNNs could reach human-expert 
cardiologist level. However, despite of the excellent performance 
in classification accuracy, it has been shown that DNNs are highly 
vulnerable to adversarial noises which are subtle changes in input 
of a DNN and lead to a wrong class-label prediction with a high 
confidence. Thus, it is challenging and essential to improve 
robustness of DNNs against adversarial noises for ECG signal 
classification –a life-critical application. In this work, we designed 
a CNN for classification of 12-lead ECG signals with variable 
length, and we applied three defense methods to improve 
robustness of this CNN for this classification task. The ECG data 
in this study is very challenging because the sample size is limited, 
and the length of each ECG recording varies in a large range. The 
evaluation results show that our customized CNN reached 
satisfying F1 score and average accuracy, comparable to the top-6 
entries in the CPSC2018 ECG classification challenge, and the 
defense methods enhanced robustness of our CNN against 
adversarial noises and white noises, with a minimal reduction in 
accuracy on clean data. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
      Electrocardiogram (ECG) is widely used for monitoring the 
condition of cardiovascular system. After many years of 
residency training, a cardiologist becomes experienced in 
reading ECG graphs, detect abnormalities, and classify signals 
into different disease categories, which is tedious and time-
consuming. As an alternative solution, researchers have 
developed deep neural networks (DNNs), especially 
convolutional neural networks (CNNs) for ECG signal analysis 
with excellent classification accuracy [1]. S. Kiranyaz et al. [2] 
designed an adaptive one-dimensional (1D) CNN for ECG 
classification, and the experiment showed that their method can 
achieve not only a high classification accuracy (99%) but also 
good performance in sensitivity (95.9%), specificity (99.5%), 
and positive predictivity (96.2 %). In 2017, U. Rajendra et al. 
[3] applied a CNN to classify the heartbeats, and their model 
achieved an accuracy of 94.03% and 93.47% for the diagnostic 
classification of heartbeats in ECGs, respectively. M. Kachuee 
et al. [4] designed a residual CNN to classify ECG heartbeats 
into five categories, and the CNN model was trained and 
evaluated on PhysionNet’s MIT-BIH datasets and achieved an 
accuracy of 93.4%. Awni Y. Hannun, et al. [5] developed a 
CNN to classify 12 rhythm classes using a dataset of 91,232 
single-lead ECGs from 53,877 patients, which is the largest (yet 
private) dataset compared to other datasets in the literature, and 
the classification accuracy was similar to that of cardiologists. 
Therefore, with a sufficiently large amount of data and a 
carefully designed network structure, DNN models could reach 
human expert radiologist level for ECG signal classification, 
and for each patient, the analysis can be done in a fraction of a 
second. For patients in developing countries where human-
expert radiologists are lacking, a DNN-based automated ECG 
diagnostic system would be an affordable solution to improve 
health outcomes.   
      However, recent studies have shown that despite the high 
classification accuracy of DNNs, they are susceptible to 
adversarial noises, which are small perturbations to input of the 
networks, even imperceptible to human eyes, and able to 
change the prediction of DNNs [6]. Adversarial noises are 
usually generated by algorithms, called adversarial attacks, 
which can be classified into two categories based on whether 
the whole structure of the network is known by the attacker. It 
is a white box adversarial attack if the attacker knows the inner 
structure of the network. White box attacks often use the 
gradient information (e.g. gradient of the loss with respect to 
input) from the target network to construct adversarial noise 
which is added to the original input, and two well-known white 
box attacks are Fast Gradient Signed Method (FGSM) [7] and 
Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) [8]. It is a black box attack 
if the attacker has almost no knowledge of the inner structure 
of the network. One approach for black box attack is called 
transfer-based attack, in which a substitute network is designed 
and trained on the input-output pairs of the oracle network (the 
target network to be attacked), so that the substitute network 
can learn the decision boundary of the oracle network; after 
training, the substitute network can be used to construct 
adversarial noises to attack the oracle network [9]. Even 
simpler, the substitute network can be trained on the dataset that 
is used to train the oracle, and then adversarial noises are 
constructed using the substitute network and subsequently 
applied to the oracle network, with the hope that the adversarial 
noises are transferrable between networks. The weakness of 
transfer-based attacks is discussed by Jonathan Uesato et. al in 
[10]: "success of the attack is highly dependent on the similarity 
between" the substitute and the oracle. Another approach is to 
generate random samples around the input sample and use these 
random samples together with the original sample to estimate 
the gradient of the target network, and then the estimated 
gradient can be used for attacks [10]. These attacks pose 
significant threats [6] to the deep learning systems in sensitive 
and life-critical application fields such as ECG classification. 
      To improve DNN robustness against adversarial noises, lots 
of effort has been made by researchers to develop defense 
methods. Currently, the most popular defense strategy is 
adversarial training. The basic idea of adversarial training is to 
generate adversarial noises by using an adversarial attack and 
add the noises to the samples for training. The resulting noisy 
samples are called adversarial samples. Through adversarial 
training, the network can learn some features of adversarial 
noises, and then its decision boundary is updated so that it will 
become difficult to push the input across the decision boundary 
by adding a small amount of noise. Adversarial training is 
straightforward but has problems. For example, it is very 
computationally expensive and time-consuming to generate 
adversarial samples, and low-quality adversarial samples can be 
misleading and even reduce the classification accuracy of 
networks. Therefore, different adversarial training-based 
defense methods were proposed [6], which share the same basic 
idea and vary in how the adversarial samples are generated. Ali 
et al. [11] designed an efficient algorithm to reduce the high 
computation cost of generating adversarial samples, which 
needs to alter the standard training process. Zhang et al. [12] 
proposed to generate high-quality adversarial examples with 
less affection on the accuracy of network. Parallel to adversarial 
training, regularization terms can be added to the loss function 
to reduce the sensitivity of network output with respect to the 
input. Regularization terms could be the gradient magnitude of 
loss with respect to input [13], Jacobian regularization [14], or 
NSR Regularization [15]. 
      In this paper, we designed a CNN for classification of ECG 
signals and applied three defense methods to improve 
robustness of this CNN against adversarial noises as well as 
white noises. One of the defense methods is based on 
adversarial training, and the other two methods uses 
regularization terms. The ECG data in experiment is publicly 
available from the China Physiological Signal Challenge 2018 
(CPSC2018) [16]. The dataset is challenging for classification. 
The number of recordings is only 6,877, and the time duration 
of a recording can vary from 6 to 60 seconds. With a sampling 
rate of 500 Hz, the number of amplitude values in a digital ECG 
signal can vary from 3000 to 30000.  Results from our 
experiment showed that our customized CNN reached 
satisfying F1 score and accuracy, compared to top-6 methods 
in CPSC2018, and the defense methods successfully enhanced 
robustness of this CNN against adversarial noises and white 
noises, with a minimal reduction in accuracy on clean data. 
II. METHODOLOY 
      In this section, we will present our customized CNN, 
discuss the adversarial robustness issue, and introduce the three 
defense methods that we applied to improve the robustness of 
the CNN in this study. 
A. The Customized CNN 
      We designed a CNN to classify the ECG signals and handle 
the challenge of variable input signal length. The high-level 
architecture of this neural network is shown in Fig. 1. To 
describe the CNN, we use "Cov (a, b, c, d, e)" to represent a 
convolution layer with "a" input channels, "b" output channels, 
kernel size of "c", stride of "d" and padding of "e"; "Linear (f, 
g)" to denote a linear layer with input size of "f" and output size 
of "g"; "MaxPool (h, i, j)" to denote max-pooling with kernel 
size of h, stride of i and padding size of j; "AvgPool (k, l, m)" 
to denote average-pooling with kernel size of k, stride of l and 
padding size of m; "GN" to denote group normalization [17]. 
The network has 4 convolution blocks of the same structure as 
shown in Fig. 1, which will shrinkage the size of the input 
tensor and doubled the number of channels.  
RNN is typical used to handle a time sequence with variable 
length. However, RNN runs very slow. To enable the CNN to 
handle variable signal length, we used zero-padding and mask. 
Each signal (i.e. the ECG recording from a patient) is padded 
with zeros to a fixed length of 33792 in order to process the 
signals in mini-batches. The network should ignore the zeros in 
signals, and this is realized by using an input mask with a fixed 
length of 33792. For valid elements of the padded signal, the 
corresponding elements of the mask are ones. For zero elements 
of the padded signal, the corresponding elements of the mask 
are zeros. To obtain the output mask, an average-pooling is 
applied to the input mask by estimating what the mask should 
be after a series of convolutional operations on the mask. Then, 
a valid output feature is obtained by multiplying the output 
mask and the feature output from the convolution blocks. After 
this operation, a channel-wise averaging weighted by the mask 
is performed to reduce the dimension of the feature from a 
variable length to a fixed length of 512. After the final linear 
layer, classification scores (a.k.a. logits) are obtained. 
B. PGD-based Adversarial Attack and Adversariel Training 
Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) [8] is regarded as the 
strongest first-order white box adversarial attack. To evaluate 
the robustness of different adversarial training methods [8][18], 
we use projected gradient descent (PGD) to generate 
adversarial noises, which is widely used for defense method 
evaluation [10][19].  K-PGD attack on clean input signal 𝑥 with 
𝐾 iterations are performed by:  
𝑥𝑘 = ∏ (𝑥𝑘−1 + α ⋅ 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛(∇𝑋𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠(𝑥
𝑘−1)))      (1) 
where α is the step size and 𝑥𝑘 is the adversarial example from 
the 𝑘-th iteration/step. If the noise added to input 𝑥 is larger 
than the given noise level ϵ, the projection operation ∏() in 
PGD will project it back onto a ϵ -ball, i.e, ‖𝑥𝑘 − 𝑥‖𝑝 ≤ ϵ 
where ‖ ‖𝑝 is the vector Lp norm and p is usually infinity or 
2. Assuming 𝑥 is correctly-classified by a network, then, after 
𝐾  iterations, the 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠  on the noisy sample 𝑥𝐾  becomes very 
large such that 𝑥𝐾  is wrong-classified. Usually the decision 
boundary of a network, which is trained with cross-entropy loss 
and clean data, is very close to the samples. As a result, a tiny 
amount of adversarial noises on the input sample can cause a 
wrong classification. 
      In this paper, ϵ is named the noise level. We only focus on 
the noise level no larger than 0.01 because when ϵ is larger than 
0.01, the perturbation on ECG signal is so significant that even 
human eyes can spot the noises on 𝑥𝐾, and it is also unrealistic 
to have such large noises in signals. (see Appendix for 
examples). 
      The basic idea of adversarial training [7] is to generate 
adversarial samples by an algorithm (e.g. PGD) and use them 
as part of the training data. In this way, the trained model may 
become robust against adversarial noises. Madry et al. [8] 
proposed to train models with adversarial samples produced by 
PGD adversarial attack and achieved state-of-the-art robustness 
against strong L-infinity norm based attacks on MNIST and 
CIFAR-10 dataset. Since the success of this PGD-based 
adversarial training method, many other defense methods 
leveraging PGD adversarial attack to generate adversarial 
samples have been proposed, such as Max-Margin Adversarial 
(MMA) Training [20] and  Increasing-Margin Adversarial 
(IMA) Training [21], which may work better for large 
adversarial noises. In this experiment, we applied the vanilla 
adversarial training with 20-PGD [11][7] to improve the 
robustness of the CNN for the classification of ECG signals. 
The loss function of this vanilla adversarial training method is: 
 
𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠 = 0.5𝐿𝐶𝐸(𝑥, 𝑦) + 0.5𝐿𝐶𝐸(𝑥ϵ, 𝑦)            (2) 
 
where 𝐿𝐶𝐸  is cross-entropy loss and 𝑥ϵ is an adversarial sample 
(i.e. output from 20-PGD) on noise level of ‖ϵ‖. To strengthen 
the vanilla adversarial training methods, the level of  the noise 
added to the input is scaling up linearly as the number of epochs 
increases during training [20]: 
 
ϵ𝑡 = ϵ(𝑡 − 10)/(𝑡𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 10)               (3) 
          
where ϵ𝑡 is the noise level for the current epoch 𝑡; ϵ is the user-
defined maximum noise level; 𝑡𝑚𝑎𝑥  is the user-defined total 
number of training epochs. To help the model converge, during 
the training process, the term 0.5𝐿𝐶𝐸(𝑥ϵ, 𝑦) will not be added 
to the loss function until the 11-th epoch.  
C. Jacobian Regularization 
      The idea of Jacobian Regularization [14] is to penalize large 
gradient of the loss function with respect to the input, during 
the post-processing training phase. Adversarial noises are 
essentially small changes in the input, which cause large 
changes in the network’s output. To reduce the sensitivity to 
input change, a regularization term in the form of the Frobenius 
norm of the network’s Jacobian matrix evaluated on the input 
can be added to the loss function. The loss function is given by: 
 
𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠 = 𝐿𝐶𝐸(𝑥, 𝑦) + λ√∑ ∑ ∑ (
∂
∂𝑥𝑑
𝑧𝑘(𝑥𝑛))
2𝑁
𝑛=1
𝐾
𝑘=1
𝐷
𝑑=1
   (4) 
 
where 𝐿𝐶𝐸  is cross-entropy loss, 𝐷  is the number of input 
dimensions, 𝐾 is the number of classes, 𝑁 is the batch size, 𝑥 =
{𝑥1, 𝑥2, … , 𝑥𝑖 , … , 𝑥𝑁} is the input batch data (𝑛  is sample index 
in the batch), 𝑦  contains the ground truth labels, and 𝑧 =
{𝑧1, 𝑧2, … , 𝑧𝑖 , … , 𝑧𝐾} is the output logits of the neural network. 
𝑥𝑑  refers to the d-th dimension of a sample 𝑥𝑛 . In this 
experiment, because of high input dimension, we use mean 
instead of sum in the regularization term. In this way, we can 
avoid too large regularization during the training process, 
which makes it easier to reach the balance between robustness 
and accuracy. The loss function used in our experiment is 
 
𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠 = 𝐿𝐶𝐸(𝑥, 𝑦) +
𝜆
𝑁𝐾
√∑ ∑ ∑ (
∂
∂𝑥𝑑
𝑧𝑘(𝑥𝑖))
2𝑁
𝑛=1
𝐾
𝑘=1
𝐷
𝑑=1
  (5) 
 
 
Fig. 1. The architecture of the CNN 
 
       
                  
  
         
             
                
  
         
                
  
                
  
         
                
  
         
                
  
                
  
         
                    
    
          
       
             
          
               
               
     
             
  
The only parameter needs to be adjusted is λ. To help the model 
converge during the training process, the regularization term 
will not be added to loss function until the 11-th epoch. 
D. NSR Regularization  
      The NSR Regularization in this study is the "Loss2" 
proposed in [15]. The idea of this regularization is to minimize 
the noise-to-signal ratio (NSR). Given an input sample 𝑥 
(converting 𝑥 to a vector), the output of the CNN can be exactly 
expressed by a "linear" equation [20]: 
 
𝑧 = 𝑊𝑇𝑥 + 𝑏                                  (6) 
 
where the weight matrix 𝑊 will be different for different 𝑥, and 
the bias vector 𝑏 will different for different 𝑥.  The output is a 
vector 𝑧 = [𝑧1, … , 𝑧9]
𝑇  where 𝑧𝑖  is the output logit of class-i 
and the total number of classes is 9 in this application. Let 𝑤𝑖  
be the 𝑖-th row of  𝑊 and 𝑏𝑖 be the 𝑖-th element of 𝑏, then we 
have 
𝑧𝑖 = 𝑤𝑖
𝑇𝑥 + 𝑏𝑖                              (7) 
 
      During an adversarial attack, a noisy vector ϵ is generated 
and added to the input 𝑥, and then the output becomes: 
 
𝑧𝑦,ϵ = 𝑤𝑦,ϵ
𝑇 (𝑥 + ϵ) + 𝑏𝑦,ϵ                      (8) 
      If the noise ϵ is small enough, assume that: 𝑤𝑦 ≈ 𝑤𝑦,ϵ and 
𝑏𝑦 ≈ 𝑏𝑦,ϵ . This assumption is valid if the "on/off" states of 
ReLU units do not change significantly when adversarial noise 
is added. Therefore 
 
𝑧𝑦,ϵ ≈ 𝑤𝑦
𝑇𝑥 + 𝑏𝑦 + 𝑤𝑦
𝑇ϵ = 𝑧𝑦 + 𝑤𝑦
𝑇ϵ          (9) 
          
      Then, define NSR and apply Hölder's inequality: 
 
𝑁𝑆𝑅𝑦 =
|𝑤𝑦
𝑇ϵ|
|𝑧𝑦|
≤
‖𝑤𝑦‖𝑞 .
‖ϵ‖𝑝
|𝑧𝑖|
                 (10) 
 
where 
1
𝑝
+
1
𝑞
= 1. In this work, we focus on L-infinity norm 
‖ϵ‖∞ = ϵ𝑚𝑎𝑥 , and therefore 
 
𝑁𝑆𝑅𝑦 ≤
‖𝑤𝑦‖1. ϵ𝑚𝑎𝑥
|𝑧𝑦|
= 𝑅2                      (11) 
                  
      By combining the regularization term 𝑅2 with Margin loss 
and Mean Square Error (MSE) loss for classification, the loss 
function for NSR Regularization is obtained, given by 
 
𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠 = (𝑧𝑦 − 1)
2
+ ∑(𝑧𝑖 − 0)
2
𝑖≠𝑦
 
+ ∑ 𝑚𝑎𝑥(0,1 − 𝑧𝑦 + 𝑧𝑖)
𝑖
+ 𝛽𝑙𝑜𝑔 (𝑅2 + 1)       (12) 
            
      In the experiment, ϵ𝑚𝑎𝑥  is set to 1, and β is determined on 
the validation set. The Margin loss and the regularization term 
𝑙𝑜𝑔 (𝑅2 + 1)  are only used for correctly-classified samples; 
and for wrongly-classified samples, 𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠 only contains MSE 
loss. To help the model converge during the training process, 
the regularization term and Margin loss will not be added to the 
loss function until the 11-th epoch. 
 
III. EXPERIMENT SETUP 
A. Data 
      The ECG data in this experiment is from the China 
Physiological Signal Challenge 2018 (CPSC2018) [16], which 
is described in detail by [22]. This dataset is publicly available. 
There are 6877, 12-lead ECG recordings in this dataset. The 
ECG signals were sampled by a frequency of 500 Hertz, for 6 
seconds to 60 seconds (note: a few signals have 144 seconds). 
Namely, each ECG sample (referring to the whole digit ECG 
signal from a patient) in the dataset has 12 leads/channels, and 
each sample has a variable length from 3000 to 72000. This 
dataset has 9 categories, which are "Normal" (918 samples), 
"Atrial fibrillation (AF)" (1098 samples), "First-degree 
atrioventricular block (I-AVB)" (704 samples), "Left bundle 
branch block (LBBB)" (207 samples), "Right bundle branch 
block (RBBB)" (1695 samples), "Premature atrial contraction 
(PAC)" (556 samples), "Premature ventricular contraction 
(PVC)" (672 samples), "ST-segment depression (STD)" (825 
samples) and "ST-segment elevated (STE)" (202 samples). 
      We preprocessed the data. First, we removed the samples 
with multiple labels (477 samples). Second, from each class, we 
randomly put 5 samples into the validation set and 50 samples 
into the test set. In this way, we split the dataset into a training 
set of 5905 samples, a validation set of size 45, and a test set of 
size 450. Because this dataset is unbalanced, upsampling was 
done to augment the training set to be balanced in the number 
of samples in different categories. Third, for each sample, we 
removed Lead 3, 4, 5 and 6, which is due to the fact that Lead 
3, 4, 5 and 6 are not independent of the rest of the leads and can 
be derived from Lead 1 and 2 [23]. Fourth, for each sample, we 
scaled each lead by its maximum absolute value to make each 
lead to be within the range of -1 to 1 [24]. Then, we randomly 
padded each sample with 0 on both ends. For a few samples 
with size larger than 33792, we discarded the signal elements 
after 33792. As a result, each sample after preprocessing is a 
tensor of shape 8 × 33792. 
B. Tuning NSR Regularization on the Validation Set 
      To use the NSR Regularization, a proper β is needed to 
achieve the balance between robustness and accuracy, based on 
the performance on validation set. In Fig. 2, β in "βNSR" refers 
to the coefficient β  of regularization term. From the result 
shown in Fig. 2, it can be seen that a too small β made the model 
not robust enough (e.g., "0.4NSR"), while a too large β led to a 
significant reduction in the F1 score on clean data (e.g., 
"1.1NSR" and "1.2NSR"). In this experiment, we chose "1.0" 
as the best value of β, because among these trials shown in Fig. 
2, "1.0" is the largest value before significant reduction 
occurred in the F1 score on clean data. 
C. Tuning Jacobian Regularization on the Validation Set 
      To use Jacobian Regularization, a proper λ  is needed to 
reach the balance between robustness and accuracy. We tried a 
series of λ on the validation set and selected a proper λ based 
on the performance. In Fig. 3, " λ Jacob" denotes Jacobian 
Regularization with coefficient λ. It can be seen that a too small 
λ made the model not robust enough (e.g., "4.0Jacob"), while a 
too large λ led to a significant reduction in the F1 score on clean 
data (e.g., "74.0Jacob" and "84.0Jacob"). In this experiment, we 
chose "44.0" as the best value of  λ, because among these trials 
shown in Fig. 3, "44.0" is the largest value before the F1 score 
on clean data begins declining on validation set. The later 
experiment (in Fig. 4) also shows that clean accuracy of 
"54.0Jacob" indeed drops below 80% on test set, which is not 
acceptable in this experiment. 
IV. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
In the experiment, we applied three defense methods to 
improve robustness of our customized CNN for classification of 
ECG signals from CPSC2018. We use PGD-100 attack and 
white noises to evaluate the performance of different methods. 
PGD-100 attack-based evaluation shows how a method 
performs against strong adversarial attack that could be lunched 
by an attacker perusing personal gain at the expanse of public 
health. White noise is much weaker than the adversarial noise 
from 100-PGD but could often exist in the real world. Fig. 4 and 
Fig. 5 show the results. In total, the CNN models trained by four 
methods are compared, which are: model trained with cross-
entropy loss and clean data, denoted by "CE" (defenseless); 
model trained by Jacobian Regularization, denoted by "𝜆Jacob"; 
model trained by NSR Regularization, denoted as "𝛽 NSR"; 
model trained by vanilla adversarial training with 20-PGD, 
denoted by "advls_ϵ" where ϵ is the maximum noise level for 
training. The models were trained for 70 epochs. Training batch 
size is always 64. The noise levels in this experiment are always 
measured by L-infinity norm which can control the maximum 
noise amplitude. This experiment was conducted on a server 
with Nvidia Tesla V100 GPU processor (32 GB memory) and 
Intel(R) Xeon(R) E5-2698 v4 CPU processor (2.20GHz).  
Training "CE" costs less than 2 hours in total. Training with 
NSR Regularization costs about 600 seconds per epoch. 
Training with Jacobian regularization costs about 1200 seconds 
per epoch. Training with vanilla adversarial training costs about 
600 seconds per epoch.  
A. 100-PGD Evaluation 
In this section, we evaluate the trained models by using 100-
PGD adversarial attack. We focus on noise level no larger than 
0.01. When noise level is larger than 0.01, the perturbation is 
so significant that even human eyes can hardly recognize what 
the original image should be and thus it is no longer a noise-
robustness problem (see Appendix A).  
      First, the "CE" version of our customized CNN can classify 
this ECG data with average accuracy of 80% and F1 score of 
nearly 0.790 on clean data. Compared with results of other 
entries reported in CPSC2018 [16], this F1 score is in top 6 (F1 
scores of the Top-6 methods are 0.837, 0.830, 0.806, 0.802, 
0.791 and 0.783), which means the "CE" version reached a 
satisfying accuracy for this classification task on clean data, 
without using recurrent neural network. Second, according to 
Fig. 4, compared with "CE", three defense methods 
successfully improve the robustness of the CNN against 100-
PGD adversarial attack. 100-PGD attack is so strong that the 
accuracy of "CE" drops to 0% at noise level of 0.01. As a 
comparison, at the noise level of 0.01, "1.0NSR", "44.0Jacob" 
and "advls_0.01" keep an average accuracy of more than 60% 
and F1 score of more than 0.6, ranking at least top 30 in 
CPSC2018. Furthermore, from Fig. 4, it is clear that "1.0NSR" 
and "advls_0.01" have higher average accuracy about 83% and 
F1 score about 0.83 on clean data, which would rank in top-3 
in CPSC2018. The increase in clean accuracy is achieved by 
using the regularization (NSR Regularization) or data 
augmentation (adversarial samples generated by vanilla 
adversarial training). This improvement is significant in this 
challenging experiment due to the small sample size and high-
dimensional data samples. The results also suggest that 
improving robustness may not always be in conflict of 
increasing accuracy. We note that none of the methods in 
CPSC2018 are evaluated against 100-PGD adversarial attack. 
      However, we observe that "advls_ϵ" has some weaknesses. 
First, it is very sensitive to the user-defined noise level ϵ , which 
makes the CNN to be robust only around the specific noise level 
of ϵ. From Fig. 4, "advls_0.01" has a good resist to 100-PGD at 
noise level of no larger than 0.01 and the accuracy drops 
significantly after that; For "advls_0.05", accuracy drops 
slowly before 0.05 and then significantly. Also, a too large 𝜖 
leads to significant reduction of classification accuracy on clean 
  
Fig. 3(a). Accuracy of Jacobian 
Regularization on the validation set 
Fig. 3(b). F1 score of Jacobian 
Regularization on the validation set 
  
Fig. 2(a). Accuracy of NSR 
Regularization on the validation set 
Fig. 2(b). F1 score of NSR 
Regularization on the validation set 
data (e.g., "advls_0.05" and "advls_0.1"). This can be explained 
as follows. A too large perturbation on the sample can push the 
input to cross the optimal decision boundary for classification. 
A too small 𝜖 all has relatively week effect on CNN robustness 
(e.g., "advls_0.005"). 
      In this evaluation, we focus on noise level no larger than 
0.01. Within this noise level, "1.0NSR" outperforms 
"44.0Jacob" on clean data accuracy, and it also outperforms 
"advls_0.01" on robustness against 100-PGD attack. 
B. White Noise Evaluation 
      In this section, we evaluate the defense methods using white 
noises of different levels. Basically, white noises from a 
uniform distribution are added to the samples in the test sets, 
and the accuracy of each trained model on these noisy samples 
are measured. The L-infinity norm of the random noise can be 
controlled in each individual trail. Compared with 100-PGD, 
random white noise is more like the natural noises in ECG 
signals, which are originated from the recording device (e.g. 
electromyogram noise and power line interference). The results 
are shown in Fig. 5. Obviously, two regularization-based 
methods, "1.0NSR" and "44.0Jacob", outperform vanilla 
adversarial training by making the CNN robust to white noises. 
According to Fig. 5, "1.0NSR" has the best performance when 
noise level is smaller than 0.4 and keeps the accuracy almost 
unchanged when noise level is smaller than 0.2. When the noise 
level exceeds 0.4, the accuracy starts to drop significantly, 
which may be related to the strong assumption in the NSR 
Regularization method. However, 0.4 is a very large noise level, 
under which the signals are changed significantly (see noise 
level of 0.1 at Appendix A). As a result, "1.0NSR" has enough 
robustness against white noises. "44.0Jacob" in general has a 
very good resistance to large white noises and an average 
accuracy of more than 70% at noise level of 0.6. However, the 
accuracy of every "advls_ϵ" drops significantly as the white 
noise level increases. The performance of ""advls_ϵ" in this 
evaluation is not as good as that in the 100-PGD evaluation. 
The reason could be that the vanilla adversarial training is based 
on the specific type of adversarial noises from PGD, while 
regularization term-based methods are not. 
V. CONCLUSION    
      In this paper, for classification of the ECG signal data from 
the China Physiological Signal Challenge 2018, we designed a 
CNN that can handle high-dimensional and variable length 
input. We applied three representative defense methods to 
improve the robustness of this CNN against noises. 100-PGD 
adversarial attack and white noises are used to evaluate the 
defense methods, and all of the methods successfully improved 
the robustness of CNN against 100-PGD and white noise, 
compared to the model trained only with cross-entropy loss and 
clean data. We found out that vanilla adversarial training is very 
sensitive to the user-defined noise level ϵ , and the 
regularization-based defense methods can provide better 
resistance against white noises than vanilla adversarial training. 
We hope that this study could facilitate the development of 
robust solutions for automated ECG diagnosis.  
Note: 
(1) we will release the code when the paper is accepted. 
(2) all figures are in high resolution, please zoom in. 
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APPENDIX A 
      In this section, Lead 1 of an ECG signal with different levels of adversarial noises is shown. The adversarial attack is PGD-100 
and the target network is our CNN, which has been trained with cross entropy Loss for 70 epochs. As we can see, when the noise 
level is larger than 0.01 (Fig. 6 (g)), the original ECG signal is even hardly recognizable by human eye. 
  
(a) clean ECG (b) ECG on noise level 0.001 
  
(c) ECG on noise level 0.003 (d) ECG on noise level 0.005 
  
(e) ECG on noise level 0.01 (f) ECG on noise level 0.03 
  
(g) ECG on noise level 0.05 (h) ECG on noise level 0.1 
Fig. 6. ECG signal Lead I on different levels of adversarial noises 
APPENDIX B 
The tables in the section are results shown in Fig. 4. 
TABLE 1. ACCURACY OF METHODS ON THE TEST SET, UNDER 100-PGD 
noise level 0 0.001 0.003 0.005 0.007 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.1 
advls_0.005(ACC) 0.840 0.820 0.770 0.720 0.650 0.500 0.080 0.010 0.000 
advls_0.01(ACC) 0.830 0.820 0.790 0.760 0.720 0.640 0.220 0.070 0.010 
advls_0.05(ACC) 0.730 0.700 0.650 0.620 0.600 0.570 0.470 0.400 0.190 
advls_0.1(ACC) 0.630 0.590 0.580 0.530 0.520 0.510 0.440 0.430 0.320 
CE(ACC) 0.800 0.630 0.270 0.090 0.030 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1.0NSR(ACC) 0.830 0.820 0.800 0.770 0.730 0.670 0.300 0.150 0.040 
44.0Jacob(ACC) 0.800 0.800 0.770 0.740 0.720 0.680 0.450 0.300 0.060 
54.0Jacob(ACC) 0.780 0.770 0.760 0.750 0.730 0.690 0.470 0.320 0.080 
 
TABLE 2. F1 SCORES OF METHODS ON THE TEST SET, UNDER 100-PGD 
noise level 0 0.001 0.003 0.005 0.007 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.1 
advls_0.005(F1) 0.833 0.820 0.765 0.706 0.641 0.489 0.068 0.010 0.000 
advls_0.01(F1) 0.821 0.814 0.787 0.746 0.712 0.624 0.226 0.074 0.009 
advls_0.05(F1) 0.716 0.684 0.639 0.605 0.594 0.568 0.479 0.408 0.209 
advls_0.1(F1) 0.620 0.588 0.572 0.531 0.527 0.512 0.449 0.441 0.333 
CE(F1) 0.790 0.624 0.272 0.097 0.031 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1.0NSR(F1) 0.830 0.818 0.793 0.768 0.722 0.663 0.292 0.148 0.041 
44.0Jacob(F1) 0.802 0.797 0.768 0.740 0.719 0.680 0.451 0.305 0.057 
54.0Jacob(F1) 0.777 0.768 0.759 0.747 0.725 0.685 0.461 0.319 0.082 
 
 
